Should we tell other people the truth? Should we believe what other people tell us? This chapter argues that something like these norms of truth-telling and belief govern our production and receipt of testimony in conversational contexts. It then attempts to articulate these norms and determine their justification. More fully specified these norms prescribe that speakers tell the truth informatively, or be trustworthy, and that audiences presume that speakers do this, or trust. These norms of trust, as norms of conversational cooperation, would then seem to be justified on the basis of the interest that each has in the cooperative outcome. The norms of trust would then be justified as Lewisian conventions. However, the joint outcome prescribed by these norms is not an equilibrium point: a speaker always does better to have an audience's trust and the liberty to tell the truth or not as it suits. In this way, testimony presents a problem of trust. The justification of these norms of trust then starts from the recognition that any society that did not resolve this problem of trust would be stymied as a society. The resolution of this problem then requires securing the motivations characteristic of trusting and being trustworthy, where to have these motivations is to have an ethical outlook defined in terms of internalising these norms of trust. This justification is genealogical and it is one of value.
Knowing Knowing (that Such and Such) 0006 This chapter argues that one cannot understand Austin's response to the philosophical problem of other minds without appreciating the centrality to this response of issues concerning the epistemology of testimony, of issues concerning the way in which we acquire knowledge and justification from the word of others. Austin argues that a speaker's avowals of her own conscious psychological states are speech acts that can serve both to express these states and to provide an audience with a distinctive testimonial reason for believing that the speaker is in these states. He thus takes the philosophical problem of other minds to be motivated in large part by general worries about believing and trusting others, by an inability or unwillingness to believe others and to trust them for the truth about themselves. Existing metasemantic projects presuppose that word-(or sentence-) types are part of the non-semantic base. This paper proposes a new strategy: an endogenous account of word types, that is, one where word types are fixed as part of the metasemantics. On this view, it is the conventions of truthfulness and trust that ground not only the meaning of the words (meaning by convention) but also what the word type is of each particular token utterance (words by convention). The same treatment extends to identifying the populations through which the conventions prevail. The paper considers whether this proposal leads to new underdetermination challenges for metasemantics, and makes a case that it does not.
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